Unsuccessful League of Nations

The Soviet Union truism the League as a thingummy to keep capitalists divided, though as World War II loomed it was a device to unite them against the Nazis. Therefore, the Covenant League failed because nationalism reasserted itself, a skylark of the original charter. The contradictions of the League weakened it. State sovereignty was deemed mutually exclusive with supranational control, and policies aimed at maintaining geo semipolitical status quo were inconsistent with changes occurring in society.

Another weakness was the failure of the US to come into the League. smith attributes this to the combination of Woodrow Wilson's single-minded determination to be at the touch of the League and Versailles, his failure to include both domestic political adversaries in the American delegation, and his failure to compromise on any feature of the League provisions during the American debate on ratification, which failed (194-6). Deprived of American break aparticipation in the League, the League itself woolly-headed prestige and failed the test of effectiveness as the world move toward World War II.

Nevertheless, the League Covenant must be interpreted as a precursor of the United Nations prosecute. The UN Charter was meant to provided for an international representative organization in the General multitude and a littler, executive body in the form of the trade protection Council, comprising permanent great powers and temporary and rotating smaller powers. The UN was aimed at secure peaceful settlement of internation

A need for power and security appears to know fostered smaller wars, complicate by alliances and rivalries and competition for the best and latest weapons of war, that the have-nations are animated to manufacture and export and that the have-not-nations appear eager to acquire (Brown 224). What that comes surmount to is the reemergence of nationalism and inevitable attempts to assert power on the part of nation-states. On the other hand, there is evidence that the breakup of the USSR and its smaller republics, preoccupied with their economic survival, are not in a position to launch entrepreneurial territory experiments.

According to Hillen and Noonan, the approach of former Soviet satellite nations such as Hungary and Poland into NATO created "a de jure buffer zone between the historic great powers of Continental Europe, Germany and Russia. Second, the inclusion of Hungary creates a firewall against Balkan instability. A drawback is that Hungary will not ploughshare a common border with any Alliance member. It has, however, turn out useful as a staging area for NATO trading operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina." In other words, smaller-nation rather than larger-nation issues reached superpower array concern after the breakup of the USSR in ways that would have been inconceivable when the US and the USSR were engaged in the superpower chilly War.

Hayes, Carlton J.H., Baldwin, Marshall Whithed, and Cole, Charles Woolsey. History of Western Civilization. 2nd ed. New York: the Macmillan Company, 1967.

Odom, William E., and Robert Dujarric. terra firma or Empire? Russia, Asia, and the Transcaucasus. Indianapolis: Hudson Institute, 1995.

Goldman, Eric F. The Crucial Decade and After, America, 1945-1960. A Vintage Book. New York: Random House, Inc., 1960.

Brown sets the difficulties of pr steadyting war even where intentions of peaceful states are good must beside efforts throughout taradiddle to eliminate war altogether. Without what Dr. King called a true transition of values (354), in
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